Towards A Neo-Darwinian Synthesis Of Neoclassical And Behavioral Economics by Burnham, Terence C.
Chapman University
Chapman University Digital Commons
ESI Publications Economic Science Institute
2013
Towards A Neo-Darwinian Synthesis Of
Neoclassical And Behavioral Economics
Terence C. Burnham
Chapman University, burnham@chapman.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_pubs
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in ESI Publications by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Burnham, T. C. (2012). "Towards a neo-Darwinian synthesis of neoclassical and behavioral economics," Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization, 90, S113-S127. DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.015
Towards A Neo-Darwinian Synthesis Of Neoclassical And Behavioral
Economics
Comments
NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing,
corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this
document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive
version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, volume 90 supplement,
jn 2012. DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.015
The Creative Commons license below applies only to this version of the article.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0
License.
Copyright
Elsevier
This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_pubs/64
  
 
 
CAVEMAN ECONOMICS 
Towards a Biological Synthesis of  
Neoclassical and Behavioral Economics. 
© Terence C. Burnham 
October 2011 
 
 
Abstract 
 
There is a schism within economics between the neoclassical view that people optimize and the 
behavioral view that people are filled with biases and heuristics. In recent decades, the behavioral 
school has been on the ascent. A primary cause of the behavioral ascent is the experimental evidence of 
deviations between actual behavior and the neoclassical prediction of behavior.  While behavioral 
scholars have documented these “anomalies,” they have made little progress explaining the origin of 
such behavior. This paper proposes a biological and evolutionary foundation for the anomalies of 
behavioral economics by separating proximate and ultimate causation.  Such a foundation may allow for 
a re-uniting of economics; a neo-Darwinian synthesis of neoclassical and behavioral economics.  
  
  
Introduction 
Economics is divided into two competing schools based on divergent views of human nature. 
Neoclassical economists assume that people make optimal decisions. In sharp contrast, behavioral 
economists believe that people make systematic mistakes.  
Behavioral economics has made significant advances in recent decades. At the core of these behavioral 
successes is the empirical evidence of divergences between neoclassical predictions of human behavior 
and actual human behavior. Richard Thaler calls these divergences “anomalies.” Neoclassical economics 
is unique among the social sciences in deriving conclusions from a small number of underlying axioms. 
However, each and every neoclassical axiom now has a behavioral economic literature that documents 
related anomalies.  
Neoclassical economists dismiss the behavioral anomalies as interesting quirks, laboratory artifacts, or 
small-stakes effects that can be ignored when working on important issues. Conversely, behavioral 
economists dismiss mainstream economics as irrelevant applied math. The two groups do not 
communicate productively and the schism is a major obstacle to improving economics. 
At the core of the neoclassical versus behavioral debate is the notion of optimization. Are humans good 
at solving hard problems (neoclassical view) or are humans terrible at solving all sorts of problems, even 
simple ones (behavioral view)?   
Biologists have faced similar issues regarding the behavior of non-human animals.  Animals can be 
incredibly sophisticated, and animals can also behave in ways that appear counterproductive.  While 
economics has fragmented over the apparent contradiction of animals as both optimizers and bumblers, 
biology has a single, unified view of both maximization and robust failures to maximize.  
There is no schism in biology over maximization because natural scientists differentiate between the 
“ultimate” and “proximate” causes of behavior. The ultimate cause of a behavior is based in the 
evolutionary payoffs, and is very much in the spirit of neoclassical optimization.  The proximate cause of 
a behavior is based in specific machinery or mechanism that produces the behavior.  Proximate causes 
can lead to persistent failures to optimize in the spirit of behavioral economics.  
An integrated view of behavior, that combines both ultimate and proximate causation, is richer and 
more productive than any single idea of causation. Why, for example, are roughly half of human babies 
born as girls? The ultimate cause is that an equal sex ratio is evolutionarily stable (Fisher 1930). The 
proximate cause is that the mechanism of cell division and reproduction creates male gametes in equal 
proportion to female.  Both answers are correct, and yet both are incomplete without the other.  By 
combining proximate and ultimate, we are able to obtain a better understanding of behavior.    
Are animals optimizers or are they subject to behavioral errors? The answer is both, and biologists see 
no contradiction in a combination of incredibly sophisticated behavior in one setting and failure in other 
settings.  
The caveman economic hypothesis suggests that behavioral anomalies are caused, in part, by a 
mismatch between human proximate causes and specific environments, both in the laboratory and in 
modern life. Specifically, human economic behavior might, in part, be due to the “mis-firing” of 
  
conserved brain systems that activate and then motivate behavior in response to environmental cues 
that were once reliable, but do not remain so today (McCabe 2003).  
To understand optimizing economic behavior and behavioral anomalies, economists would be well-
served to understand both the ultimate and proximate causes of behavior.   
The Schism between Neoclassical and Behavioral Economics 
The neoclassical economic model assumes the humans are good optimizers.  This view of optimal 
decision-making may seem inconsistent with suicide, obesity, chastity, poverty and many other human 
behaviors.  Such behaviors, however, are technically consistent with the neoclassical view that people 
maximize utility, not any externally observable attribute. Historically, most critiques of the neoclassical 
view that came from outside of economics did not make a major impact on the field.  
However, over the last several decades, the behavioral school has had a significant impact on economics 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Thaler 1992). The behavioral economic approach has gained traction 
because of its ability to document deviations between actual human behavior and the neoclassical 
prediction of human behavior. 
Richard Thaler (1988) describes a “behavioral anomaly” as follows, “An empirical result qualifies as an 
anomaly, if it is difficult to ‘rationalize,’ or if implausible assumptions are necessary to explain it within 
the paradigm.” In contrast to suicide and other lay critiques of neoclassical economics, the behavioral 
critique has gained traction because it works “works within the paradigm.”  
Economics is currently divided between neoclassical and behavioral scholars. Many neoclassical papers 
continue to ignore behavioral critiques. Some neoclassical scholars suggest that behavioral phenomena 
are not important because the anomalies go away with either large, real-life stakes or with learning (List 
2003; List and Levitt 2007).  
Most neoclassical work continues on a foundation that ignores behavioral anomalies.  In contrast, 
behavioral scholars are working to alter the axioms of economics,  and to re-invent the field with a new 
set of theories that are consistent with the behavioral views.   
This behavioral attempt to re-invent economics on behavioral axioms is proving difficult. This difficulty 
was anticipated as long ago as 1991, “It is in the nature of economic anomalies that they violate 
standard theory. The next question is what to do about it. In many cases there is no obvious way to 
amend the theory to fit the facts, either because too little is known, or because the changes would 
greatly increase the complexity of the theory and reduce its predictive yield.” (Kahneman, Knetsch et al. 
1991) 
This paper suggests that economists can make big improvements by incorporating the insights of natural 
scientists. It is not to say that the current approaches by neoclassical and behavior scholars are without 
merit.  After close to half a century of the behavioral approach, perhaps a non-incremental 
improvement can be achieved by looking to the natural sciences. Why should economists look outside 
the field?  
  
Natural scientists study animal behavior. Humans are animals and economics is about behavior. This 
alone might suggest a look at how natural scientists think about behavior. However, the argument for a 
natural science approach goes beyond the obvious truth that economics is a subfield of animal behavior.  
Natural scientists have grappled with the exact same paradox – behavior that contains both 
sophisticated optimization and persistent failures to optimize.    
Theories of animal behavior are consistent with both neoclassical and behavioral views. Natural 
selection favors optimization, but the maximization if achieved by specific physical machinery that does 
not maximize in all settings (Mayr 1961; Tinbergen 1963; Tinbergen 1968). The concepts of proximate 
and ultimate causation are central to natural sciences’ ability to produce a cohesive theory consistent 
with both maximization and failures to maximize.  
Proximate and Ultimate Causation in the Natural Sciences. 
While economists seek to explain all behavior through the single cause of maximization of stable 
preferences (Becker 1976), natural scientists distinguish four distinct types of causation for the 
morphology and behavior of organisms that arose by genetic evolution (Mayr 1961; Tinbergen 1963; 
Tinbergen 1968). Of particular importance is the distinction between the machinery that implements a 
particular behavior (“proximate” causation) and the evolutionary function of that behavior (“ultimate” 
causation).  
Natural scientists are able to reconcile both maximizing and non-maximizing behavior through this 
framework. For example, the proximate cause of sweetness is a biological system that links the 
ingestion of certain molecular shapes to the pleasure center of the brain. This proximate explanation 
does not connect sweetness to its evolutionary advantage or disadvantage. The ultimate cause of 
sweetness is the caloric value of sugar. Humans are built to obtain vital energy from food; sugar is a 
source of calories.  
Over evolutionary time, proximate and ultimate causation are linked. Natural selection favors proximate 
mechanisms that produce maximizing behavior. Animals that liked the taste of calorie-rich foods had 
higher reproductive success and eventually the world was filled with taste buds built to detect calories, 
or, more precisely, genes to build a taste for sweetness. This is precisely the sort of question that 
intrigued Darwin – how does evolution produce animals adapted for their environment? In this case, 
over many generations, evolution selected for genes that produce pleasure in organisms when they 
consume objects that are nutritious for them.  
Unlike temperature or color, there is no objective attribute of sweetness in the world (Johnson 1999); 
organisms have mechanisms that generate pleasure when they ingest nutritious objects. Termites may 
derive as much pleasure from eating maples trees as humans do from eating maple syrup. The sensation 
of sweetness is produced by a proximate mechanism that evolved to further the ultimate goal of genetic 
replication.  
Careful analysis of proximate and ultimate causation clarifies the effects of technological change. Sugar 
substitutes such as aspartame (a.k.a. Nutrasweet) taste sweet to humans but yield few or no calories. 
  
Substances that have no nutritional value, yet tickle human taste buds, might puzzle an ignorant 
anthropologist from Mars. 
The “tastes great, less filling” paradox is resolved by distinguishing proximate from ultimate causation. 
Evolution by natural selection built humans to find and consume foods that yielded calories in the 
ancestral environment. The mechanism for evaluating foods is reified in a specific system that is 
activated by certain molecular shapes. Novel compounds that mimic certain attributes of sugar 
stimulate the sweetness pleasure pathway yet need not yield calories. Thus, the proximate mechanism 
built with the ultimate goal of inducing maximizing behavior, produces non-maximizing behavior in 
certain novel environments.  
Proximate and ultimate causation are central to understanding behavior; particularly non-materially 
maximizing behavior. For example, rats that are given unlimited quantities of both food and drugs, 
choose to self-administer drugs to the point of starvation (Weeks 1962; Pickens and Harris 1968). This 
behavior does not maximize reproductive success, yet is not treated as an anomaly within biology. Rat 
pleasure-seeking mechanisms result in the ultimate goal of baby rats in the ancestral environment, but 
result in death in the evolutionary-novel, drug-rich environment of the laboratory. 
Distinguishing proximate and ultimate causation is useful in understanding non-material maximizing 
behavior that results from evolutionary arms races. For example, birds of many species feed the young 
of other species (e.g. cuckoos) who are labeled ‘brood parasites’ (Payne 1977). This interspecies 
‘altruism’ might appear paradoxical because the feeding does not further the genetic goals of the host 
parents.  
The puzzle of host parents that willingly feed brood parasites is resolved by distinguishing proximate and 
ultimate causation. Bird ‘altruism’ is caused by the manipulation of the hosts’ proximate feeding 
mechanisms by the parasitic species. Thus, the proximate mechanism that evolved to maximize the 
host’s payoff is co-opted to produce non-maximizing behavior.  (This view is consistent with the more 
recently documented ‘mafia’ behavior (Soler, Soler et al. 1995; Thomas, Adamo et al. 2005) of cuckoos). 
The arms race aspect of this interspecies conflict is revealed by looking across species at a variety of 
tactics used by both parasite and host (Langmore, Hunt et al. 2003).  
The concepts of proximate and ultimate causation are central to understanding non- maximizing 
behavior. This approach is the standard methodology among natural scientists, but generally has not 
been used to explain the anomalies of behavioral economics. 
Proximate Causes of Behavioral Economic Anomalies 
Why do behavioral economic anomalies exist? The hypothesis of this paper is that anomalies exist, in 
significant part, because the mechanisms selected for maximization produce aberrant behavior in some 
particular situations. This mechanistic view of anomalies is completely different from either neoclassical 
or behavioral economic views. 
Does the new theory make specific and testable hypotheses that differentiate it from prior theories? 
The subsequent two sections discuss two such findings. First, is it possible to increase altruism by 
  
stimulating human brain mechanisms that monitor the level of privacy? Second, is there a relationship 
between testosterone and the behavioral anomaly of rejections in the ultimatum game? 
As discussed next, these two approaches have produced some evidence that mechanism is involved in 
behavioral economic anomalies. The implications of this research in unknown at this time; there is 
further discussion in concluding comments.  
Eyes and Altruism: Example 1 of Proximate Causation in Economic Behavior.  
Introduction 
One of the best studied behavioral anomalies is altruism exhibited in laboratory games. A common 
assumption in economics is that people will seek to make the most money possible. A large number of 
studies show that this assumption is violated in a wide-variety of settings (Guth, Schmittberger et al. 
1982; Kahneman, Knetsch et al. 1986; Yamagishi 1986; Guth and Tietz 1990; Roth, Prasnikar et al. 1991; 
Forsythe, Horowitz et al. 1994; Hoffman, McCabe et al. 1994; Berg, Dickhaut et al. 1995; Ledyard 1995; 
Hoffman, McCabe et al. 1996; McCabe, Rassenti et al. 1996; Cameron 1999; Henrich 2000; Henrich, 
Boyd et al. 2001; Fehr and Gachter 2002). 
The fact that people voluntarily walk away from money – sometimes on the order of three months 
wages – is an important finding of behavioral economics.  Can we improve our understanding of this 
important phenomenon by investigating proximate causation?   
Three lines of research suggest that activation of the eye detection machinery might play a role in 
altruism.  
1) Anonymity affects public goods contributions. Subjects contribute significantly more to a public good 
when they are identified with their decisions than when they remain anonymous (Andreoni and Petrie 
2004). This effect is present even in a one-shot public goods game conducted in a large city between 
strangers (Rege and Telle 2004). One earlier study reports that the removal of anonymity increases 
public goods contributions only when combined with a post-game discussion (Gachter and Fehr 1999). 
2) Humans have dedicated neural architecture that activates automatically and uncontrollably upon the 
detection of faces and eyes-even if only represented in two dimensional pictures (Emery 2000; Haxby, 
Hoffman et al. 2000). This human brain system is one of several that seems to have remained largely 
unchanged for millions of years and is shared with non-human primates. Included in this system are 
circuits which evolved to be involuntarily activated by environmental cues which previously were 
reliably invariant (Brothers 1990; Brothers 1996; Corballis and Lea 1999).  This system involves brain 
areas that control sophisticated decision-making, and brain areas that are not directly under voluntary 
control. In particular, the human pre-frontal cortex, where our most complicated conscious decisions 
are made, is permanently connected with the amygdala and the superior temporal sulcus (STS), which 
are not in the pre-frontal cortex and are activated involuntarily by objects resembling human eyes. The 
evidence for this architecture and its functional origin come from a wide variety of studies of human and 
non-humans. 
  
3) Neuroeconomic studies have discovered that economic games activate areas of the human brain that 
are outside of an individual’s directly controllable decision centers (McCabe, Houser et al. 2001; Rilling, 
Gutman et al. 2002; Smith, Dickhaut et al. 2002; Sanfey, Rilling et al. 2003; Smith, Dickhaut et al. 2003). 
These modern neuroeconomic studies build upon a much older literature on involuntary influences on 
behavior. For example, the “Stroop effect” documents an involuntary effect on the ability to identify 
colors (Stroop 1935). People are considerably faster in identifying the color of letters when the meaning 
and color of words match each other. For example, subjects are faster at recognized the text color as red 
when the red letters spell ‘red’ rather than ‘green’. The Stroop effect does not go away with training, 
thus revealing persistent involuntary interference with what is typically considered a voluntary behavior 
enabled by sophisticated cognition.    
Taken together, these findings raise the possibility of ‘engineering’ a Stroop-like effect in the public 
goods game. The caveman economics hypothesis suggests that some of the anonymity effect in existing 
public goods experiments may be caused by activation of the dedicated neural architecture to detect 
faces. In other words, individuals may alter their level of prosocial behavior in the form of public goods 
contributions, in part, because of involuntary neural activation caused by the presence of human eyes 
and faces. The third strand of the literature suggests that humans do not have complete voluntary 
control over their subsequent behavior.  
Therefore, the caveman economics hypothesis predicts that humans will tend to act more prosocially in 
the presence of artificial stimuli that only resemble human faces or eyes, yet cannot be categorized as 
anything but fake. Furthermore, the caveman economics hypothesis predicts that an effect may exist 
even when the presence of eyes has no connection to either actual observation or future payoffs.    
Dedicated neural architecture for eye detection allows animals to adjust social behavior.  
All animals have interactions with individuals from their own species (conspecifics) and those of other 
species. A variety of mechanisms have been discovered across a range of species that enable individuals 
to adjust behavior in such social interactions (Krebs and Dawkins 1984). One such ability that represents 
the backbone of social problem solving in animals is the exploitation of social information provided by 
the faces and eyes of others (Emery 2000). Fish, for example, are more likely to flee from objects that 
resemble the eyes of a predator than similar-sized objects that do not resemble eyes (Coss 1978). Birds 
are more likely to fly away from an approaching human if the human’s eyes are visible (Hampton 1994). 
In addition, dogs avoid stealing forbidden food if they can see their master’s eyes (Call, Brauer et al. 
2003) while being capable of using a human’s gaze direction to find hidden food (Hare, Brown et al. 
2002). Thus, eye and face detection play a critical role in social problems across a wide range of non-
primate species.  
Non-human primates are also highly dependent on facial and eye cues in solving social problems. The 
use of social cues from eyes and faces of conspecifics are especially critical to the survival of group living 
primates whose success is largely determined by their ability to maintain close bonds with allies while 
avoiding rivals (Byrne and Whiten 1988; Tomasello, Call et al. 1998; Silk 2003). Upon the detection of 
another’s gaze, primates typically act more prosocially towards others. For example, when rhesus 
monkeys detect the eye-gaze of a conspecific directed at them, they rapidly smack their lips together – 
  
an appeasement behavior – in order to signal their friendly intent (Mistlin and Perrett 1990). Among 
chimpanzees, our closest extant genetic relatives, subordinate individuals avoid taking prized food while 
in someone’s view based on whether they can see another individuals face and eyes (Hare, Call et al. 
2001). 
Neuroscientists have studied the neural architecture underlying this problem solving in animals. This 
research has revealed dedicated neural architecture both for the detection of faces and eyes and for 
their orientation. Invasive studies of facial cues in non-humans detail the role of individual neurons in 
the amygdala and STS. Single unit recording studies demonstrate that individual neurons in the superior 
temporal sulcus and inferior temporal sulcus respond selectively to pictures of monkey faces. Monkeys 
with experimentally induced brain lesions in their STS are unable to recognize pictures of faces that they 
previously could discriminate (Campbell, Heywood et al. 1990; Heywood and Cowey 1992).  
Studies on single neurons in rhesus macaques have demonstrated that specific neurons are activated 
depending on the category of social stimuli that is perceived. For example, some neurons in the STS only 
send a signal (‘fire’) when a picture of a specific individual’s face is perceived. Other STS neurons fire at a 
picture of any face or a picture of any face that is positioned at a specific angle relative to the viewer 
(Perrett, Rolls et al. 1982; Perrett, Smith et al. 1985) while still other cells specifically fire in the presence 
of a picture of an individual with opened eyes regardless of head direction (Yamane, Kaji et al. 1988). 
Perhaps, most intriguing is that fact that single neuron recordings from within the amygdala of stump 
tailed macaques showed that many cells send the strongest signal to pictures of another monkey 
making eye contact and the weakest signal when the pictured monkey’s gaze is averted (Brothers 1990; 
Brothers, Ring et al. 1990; Brothers 1996). 
Humans inherited a dedicated neural system for the recognition of faces and eyes 
Among all animals, humans are arguably the most dependent on cues provided by faces and eyes in 
making social decisions (Haxby, Hoffman et al. 2000). In almost every social encounter, humans monitor 
the gaze direction of other humans, and process information about others’ facial identity and 
expressions. When deciding if another individual is trustworthy, for example, adult humans rely heavily 
upon information about others’ faces (Winston, Strange et al. 2002). During development, the ability of 
children to acquire language is dependent on their ability to use adult face and eye orientation to learn 
how words are associated with things in their environment (Corkum and Moore 1995; Tomasello 2000). 
The ability to use face and eye cues is so fundamental to normal functioning, that the absence of this 
ability in children is the initial diagnostic for the detection of autism, the debilitating disorder that 
severely impairs the ability of its victims to interact socially with others (Baron-Cohen, Campbell et al. 
1995). 
Such findings have led many theorists to suggest that it is our species heavy reliance on face and eye 
cues that accounts for much of our species unique cognitive abilities including language acquisition, 
deception, and cooperation (Baron-Cohen 1995; Povinelli 2000; Tomasello 2000).  
Because of the human reliance on facial cues in social problems solving, neuroscientist have also 
investigated the details of how human brains are designed to acquire and process information about 
others’ faces and eyes. Using non-invasive procedures neuroscientists have demonstrated that like other 
  
animals, humans have dedicated neural architecture designed for the sole purpose of recognizing and 
reacting to faces and eyes (Baron-Cohen 1995). The similarity of this system’s organization to that 
discovered in other primates lead some to conclude that the human eye detection system was inherited 
from our primate ancestors (Haxby, Hoffman et al. 2000). Important aspects of this system include: 
1) Humans have dedicated brain structures to store and recognize human faces. Humans with the 
condition of ‘prosopagnosia’ have no ability to recognize faces. People who suffer from prosopagnosia 
have focal damage to the occipitotemporal cortex (Damasio, Damasio et al. 1982; Landis, Cummings et 
al. 1986). 
2) Human brains have specific neural architecture for monitoring gaze. fMRI studies have revealed that 
inferior fusiform gyrus and superior temporal sulcus are responsible for gaze detection (Puce, Allison et 
al. 1998; Haxby, Hoffman et al. 2000; Hoffman and Haxby 2000). The amygdala is also involved in 
processing cues for facial recognition and orientation; humans with brain damage to their amygdala 
develop difficulties in recognizing faces and gaze direction of others (Young, Aggleton et al. 1995). 
Corroborating this finding, PET scanning of adult humans showed a significant activation of the 
amygdala during a gaze discrimination task (Kawashima, Sugiura et al. 1999).  
3) There is also evidence that activation of our human eye detection system is involuntary. Humans have 
what appear to be automatic and involuntary responses to gaze. For example, when people are asked to 
estimate the age of a person shown in a picture, fMRI results show that the parts of the brain that judge 
gaze direction and facial expression are activated (Winston, Strange et al. 2002).  
In addition, it seems that involuntary brain activation can lead to behavioral responses. For example, 
when seeing the picture of a face, humans are unable to inhibit their gaze-orienting response even when 
explicitly instructed to inhibit this reaction (Driver, Davis et al. 1999; Emery 2000; Hoffman and Haxby 
2000). The implication of these finding is that even when subjects are not intentionally attending to gaze 
direction, the brain areas for such categorization are activated. 
Summary of hypothesis and experimental results  
Over evolutionary time, humans have inherited a conserved brain system that inflexibly activates in the 
presence of eyes and faces. This activation occurs involuntarily in brain regions that are connected to 
the brain areas that control sophisticated decision-making. Thus, there is a possibility that a stimulus of 
the human dedicated neural architecture in the amygdala and STS might affect human behavior 
including economic decisions. 
The first paper proposing this hypothesis, “humans will exhibit more pro-social behavior when they 
perceive themselves to be in public … Until the advent of cameras, the ability to see a person, 
particularly her or his eyes, meant that those eyes could see you.” (Burnham 2003).  There is now a 
growing literature documenting the ability to alter economic behavior by stimulating the human eye-
detection machinery (Burnham 2003; Haley and Fessler 2005; Bateson, Nettle et al. 2006; Burnham and 
Hare 2007; Rigdon, Ishii et al. 2009), and there is one published negative result (Fehr and Schneider 
2009).  
  
In summary, stimulating the neural architecture for eye-detection was a novel, testable hypothesis 
generated by thinking that behavioral economic anomalies are caused, in part, by proximate 
mechanisms in particular settings. Neither the neoclassical nor the behavioral view predicts such a 
relationship. Thus, the caveman economics hypothesishas passed the first hurdle of a novel, testable 
hypothesis shown to be consistent with data gathered after the hypothesis was generated.   
Testosterone and Spite: Example 2 of Proximate Causation in Economic 
Behavior. 
Another famous result of behavioral economics comes in the ultimatum game. This setting provides a 
second test of the value of the proximate causation of behavioral anomalies.  
In the ultimatum game, one person (“proposer”) makes an offer to a second (“responder”) on how to 
divide a sum of money. This offer is final – an ultimatum – so if the responder rejects, there is no 
agreement and neither person earns any money. Since rejections result in no money, standard 
economic theory predicts that responders will accept all positive offers.  
The ultimatum game is a simple negotiation that is famous because people frequently reject offers of 
‘free’ money. The first ultimatum game experiment reported that low offers were frequently rejected 
and 20% of all negotiations ended with no agreement (Guth, Schmittberger et al. 1982). This deviation 
between actual human behavior and that predicted by economic theory has been replicated in myriad 
studies (Roth 1995), including games played for large stakes (Cameron 1999) and cross-culturally (Roth, 
Prasnikar et al. 1991; Henrich 2000). Who are the rejecters in the ultimatum game and why do they 
prefer no money to some money? 
Testosterone and behavior 
The hormone testosterone allows an interesting test of the hypothesis that proximate mechanisms 
produce behavioral anomalies in particular settings. In non-anonymous, potentially repeated 
interactions, high testosterone men are more willing to be confrontational because of reputational 
benefits.  In an anonymous, one-shot ultimatum game there are no reputational benefits (at least in the 
laboratory), but human proximate systems may cause high testosterone men to engage in costly 
behavior even when there is no benefit.  
In men, high testosterone is correlated with dominance-seeking behavior (Mazur and Booth 1998). 
When dominance is mediated by aggression, testosterone also appears to facilitate this process. A meta-
analysis, summarizing the results of 45 human studies, found a consistent, positive relationship between 
aggression and testosterone (Book, Starzyk et al. 2001). Testosterone is hypothesized to mediate status 
and hierarchy in an adaptive manner (Mazur 1973; Mazur 1983; Mazur 1985; Kemper 1990). High 
testosterone males are willing to be more aggressive because of lower costs of aggression and/or higher 
benefits to aggression. 
  
Testosterone is part of a physiological system that is at least partially conserved across many species. 
The ‘challenge hypothesis’ is that male testosterone varies to regulate male-male competition 
(Wingfield 1984; Wingfield, Hegner et al. 1990). For example, exogenous addition of testosterone 
increases male-male competition in a number of bird species (Silverin 1980; Hegner and Wingfield 
1987). Such competition can be extremely costly; in a study of free-living cowbirds, 6.3% of 
testosterone-implanted males were seen one year later vs. 40.7% of controls (Dufty 1989). 
Some apes show similar relationships between testosterone and behavior. Chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes) are particularly relevant because they have relatively clear dominance hierarchies and 
because they (along with Bonobos, Pan paniscus) are the closest living genetic relatives of humans. A 
study of wild chimpanzees reports that high-ranking males were more aggressive and produced higher 
levels of urinary testosterone than low-ranking males (Muller and Wrangham 2004). Testosterone and 
rank were positively correlated in a study of wild mountain gorillas (Robbins and Czekala 1997). 
Testosterone levels in men are correlated with non-economic behavior in an enormous variety of 
settings (Dabbs and Dabbs 2000). For example, professional football players have significantly higher 
testosterone levels than ministers (Dabbs, de la Rue et al. 1990) and trial lawyers have higher 
testosterone than non-litigators (Dabbs, Alford et al. 1998). Testosterone correlates with other 
competitive behaviors. Among male prisoners, high testosterone is associated with increasing levels of 
infraction including overt confrontation (Dabbs, Carr et al. 1995). High testosterone men are rated as 
less friendly and more dominant (Dabbs 1997). Consistent with Wingfield’s challenge hypothesis that 
testosterone modulates male-male competition, men in committed, romantic relationships (married or 
not) have lower testosterone than single men (Dabbs and Booth 1993; Gray, Kahlenberg et al. 2002; 
Burnham, Chapman et al. 2003).  
Testosterone is correlated with behavior in a number of non-physical settings including chess (Mazur, 
Booth et al. 1992). In one of the most economically applicable studies, subjects injected with 
testosterone were more likely to reduce a fictitious opponent’s payoff than subjects in a control group 
(Kouri, Lukas et al. 1995).  
Summary of hypothesis and experimental results  
Over evolutionary time, humans have inherited a conserved hormonal system that uses testosterone to 
modulate behavior. High testosterone animals are more willing to incur the costs of conflict because of 
the compensating benefits that accrue in future interactions. In short, testosterone modulates a 
reputation management system where high testosterone males are more willing to engage in costly 
conflict (Ellison 2001). In a review article on punishment, Clutton-Brock and Parker ( 1995) conclude 
“negative reciprocity is used by dominant animals to resist subordinate members from indulging in a 
behavior, which threatens the fitness of the dominant members”. 
A testable implication of this theory is the testosterone might be positively correlated with rejections in 
the ultimatum game.  Two papers are consistent with this view.  High testosterone men are more likely 
to reject $5 out of $40 (Burnham 2007). This first study is only a correlation. A second study injects men 
to further elucidate causation. This second study reports that high testosterone men are more likely to 
  
reject low ultimatum game offers regardless of whether the high testosterone levels are endogenous or 
elevated experimentally (Zak, Kurzban et al. 2009). 
In summary, a relationship between testosterone and ultimatum game rejections was a novel, testable 
hypothesis generated by thinking that behavioral economic anomalies are caused, in part, by proximate 
mechanisms in particular settings. Neither the neoclassical nor the behavioral view predicts such a 
relationship. Thus, the caveman economics hypothesishas passed the first hurdle of a novel, testable 
hypothesis shown to be consistent with data gathered after the hypothesis was generated.   
Discussion 
The debate between behavioral and neo-classical economics can be viewed as a failure to distinguish 
between proximate and ultimate causation.  Natural selection favors maximization of fitness, and 
equilibrium models of animal behavior are very similar to neoclassical economic models.  However, the 
biological mechanisms that effect behavior use specific cues. Thus, these proximate causes can produce 
behaviors that do not increase fitness including the anomalies of behavioral economics. 
This paper is entitled Caveman Economics because industrialized, and even agricultural, societies have 
systematic and important characteristics that differ from ancestral human environments.  Proximate 
mechanisms are more likely to lead to anomalous behavior in evolutionarily novel environments.  
If humans were in equilibrium with our environment, there would be no behavioral anomalies and no 
behavioral economics. In equilibrium, humans would be predicted to act ‘as if’ they sought to maximize 
both utility and genetic fitness. Because humans live in an evolutionarily novel environment, however, 
proximate mechanisms that evolved to maximize in the ancestral world create robust and significant 
deviations from material maximization in the modern world. Darwin grappled with issues regarding the 
fit between organism and environment. 
I do believe that natural selection will always act very slowly, often only at long 
intervals of time, and generally on only a very few of the inhabitants of the same 
region at the same time. 
     — Charles Darwin 
The Origin of Species, Ch. IV  
Darwin struggled to reconcile genetic evolution with the fact that many organisms seem designed for 
their environments. How could a myopic, slow process produce sophisticated and well-adapted 
morphology and behavior?  
Darwin solved the puzzle with the help of Lyell’s evidence (which at the time was revolutionary) that the 
earth is much older than several thousand years (Lyell 1830; Lyell 1832; Lyell 1833). With enough 
generations in a stable environment, evolution by natural selection can produce organisms whose 
design fits their environment. Thus, time provides the key for the Darwinian reconciliation of genetic 
evolution and organisms built to optimize in a particular environment. While more recent evidence 
suggests that evolution can be both less gradual (Eldredge and Gould 1972) and more rapid (Kettlewell 
  
1973; Endler 1986; Grant and Grant 1989) than Darwin believed, his essential insight about the role of 
time and organism design remains intact.  
Does evolution produce perfect animal optimizers that behavior according to neoclassical economic 
predictions?  Some animals do exhibit extremely sophisticated behavior.  For example, chimpanzees 
(Pan troglydytes) are adept at selecting the best partners for cooperative tasks (Melis, Hare et al. 2006). 
Furthermore, sophisticated behavior is not confined to primates;  small-brained dungflies (Scatophaga 
stercoraria) exhibit evolutionarily stable strategies when competing for egg laying opportunities (Parker 
1970). The behavioral ecology literature contains hundreds of studies documenting subtle and 
sophisticated non-human animal behavior (Krebs and Davies 1996).  
If non-human animals, big- and small-brained, can optimize in computationally difficult situations, why 
do humans suffer from the biases and heuristics document by behavioral economists? The answer is 
that while optimization has support within the natural sciences, there is also support for exactly the sort 
of persistent non-maximization of behavioral economics.   
While Darwin focused on the ability of evolution by natural selection to produce appropriate design and 
behavior, more recent work predicts certain types of persistently maladaptive behavior (Bowlby 1969; 
Wilson 1978; Tooby and Cosmides 1989; Tooby and Cosmides 1990). This literature, which includes the 
fields of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, places particular importance on emergence of 
agriculture and the implications for human social organization.  
For a very long time, human ancestors foraged for food. The important attributes of: i) small group size, 
ii) low population density, and iii) repeat interactions with kin, remained constant for non-human 
primates, and also for tens of thousands of years after the origin of genetically modern humans. The end 
of the Pleistocene Epoch, marked by the domestication of plants and animals, permanently altered 
these features. With increased food supplies, humans began to live in large groups, at high population 
density, and interact more frequently with non-relatives and strangers.  
Because important aspects of pre-human and human environments remained constant up until the end 
of the Pleistocene Epoch, approximately 10,000 years ago, genetic evolution had thousands of 
generations to select human genes that worked well in small kin-based groups of foragers. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to conclude that at the end of the Pleistocene, human genes were in equilibrium with 
some important aspects of the environment including key social features including the nature and 
frequency of interactions with conspecifics.  
The phrase, the “environment of evolutionary adaptiveness” or EEA was coined by Bowlby (1969; 1973) 
to describe a stylized Pleistocene environment that was in equilibrium with human genes. More 
recently, Irons (Irons 1998) argues that there was no single golden moment of equilibrium but rather a 
different ‘adaptively relevant environment’ or ARE which varies by trait. For example, the human taste 
for certain calorie-rich foods derives from a long primate history that predates the origin of humans. 
Thus, the ARE for human food preference spans more than the Pleistocene. Beyond food choice, Irons 
argues that the Pleistocene did not play a special role in the evolution of many human traits. The two 
concepts of EEA and ARE agree that ancestral environments shaped human nature; the debate is over 
the relevant time period for each trait.  
  
The importance of the ancestral environment lies in the significant and systematic discord between the 
genes adapted for that environment and modern settings. This genetic mismatch provides the key to 
understanding a wide variety of human behaviors. There has been considerable progress utilizing 
genetic mismatch in studies of non-economic behavior (for examples of primary research see (Tooby 
and Cosmides 1989; Gigerenzer 1993; Irons 1998), for book length treatments see (Wilson 1975; Wilson 
1978; Barkow, Cosmides et al. 1992; Pinker 2002), and for the seminal critique of the adaptationist 
program, see (Gould and Lewontin 1979)). 
Darwin struggled with the puzzle of efficient design produced by a slow, myopic process. Conversely, 
economists struggle to understand how a highly intelligent animal can fail to maximize in simple 
settings. Time, either in abundance or shortage, provides the solution to both mysteries.  
Caveman economics provides a path forward for reconciling behavioral and mainstream economics. 
Both neoclassical and behavioral economics find support in the natural sciences view of human nature. 
Preferences arose via evolution by natural selection. In equilibrium, human behavior would conform to 
the predictions of standard economic theory. Because human genes are not in equilibrium with 
important aspects of our environment, however, maximization of preferences leads to robust and 
significant deviations from material maximization. 
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